

SPECIAL REPORT
ON THE
COMMUNIST BACKGROUND OF THE ALGERIAN REBELLION

Prepared by the
AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR FRANCE & ALGERIA
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CONTENTS

DIRECT COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN THE ALGERIAN REBELLION	Part I - Page 1
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DIPLOMATIC AGREEMENTS MADE BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST BLOC AND THE GPRA	Part II - Page 6
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THE ROLE OF THE ALGERIAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE FLN REBELLION	Part III - Page 8
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FOREWORD

The question is often asked whether the Algerian nationalist movement is in reality a front for the world communist revolutionary conspiracy in Algeria. The following documented report has been prepared to answer this question. The FLN (National Liberation Front), since its inception, has had involved relations with the Communist-bloc countries. In addition, it has had the absolute support of both the French and Algerian Communist parties, as well as the support of Communist parties in all other countries.

The role of the FLN in the world Communist revolution is, as the report confirms, very similar to the role played by Castro's revolutionary group in Cuba. The only difference is that the FLN's relations with the Communist bloc have been far more open and obvious. The leaders of the FLN have, over a long period of time and a steady succession of trips behind the Iron Curtain, consolidated their ideological and strategic relations with the Communist bloc. The facts in this report, assembled for the first time in a single document, are, we believe, generally known to intelligence agencies here and abroad. However, press agencies and newspapers have chosen to either ignore them or play them down. It is therefore the purpose of this special report to make them generally available to the American public.

In passing, it should be remembered: "Whom the gods wish to destroy, they first make blind."

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Part I

DIRECT COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN THE ALGERIAN REBELLION

The political, military and economic ties that have linked the FLN with the Communist countries have, since 1957, been known to the American press and intelligence agencies, as well as to many political leaders. Our newspapers and politicians have consistently chosen to ignore or minimize them, and therefore it is our purpose to inform the American public of the facts so that the Communist danger in Algeria can be seen in its full light.

The support given to the FLN by the Communist bloc, under mutual guarantees, is fulfilled in three main areas of organization: labor, military, and student. The following are the facts pertaining to each area:

1. LABOR: The French CGT (Confédération Générale du Travail or General Confederation of Labor)-affiliated General Union of Algerian Trade Unions, was, until 1956, the main source of Communist influence in Algeria. (In 1956 this organization represented approximately 40,000 of the 800,000 unionized workers in Algeria.) In February 1956, the FLN sponsored and formally registered a union of its own, the General Union of Algerian Workers, and drew a number of unions away from their affiliation to the General Union of Algerian Trade Unions. Following the development of Communist labor policy after the Moscow Party Congress, the Communist-controlled General Union of Algerian Trade Unions approached both the FLN-sponsored General Union of Algerian Workers and another non-Communist union, the Union of Algerian Workers' Trade Unions, controlled by Messali Hadj (head of the rival MNA nationalist faction), to form a unified national labor organization. At the end of July, the executive committee of the General Union of Algerian Trade Unions, with the approval of the Paris CGT, decided to form a national union which would be directly affiliated with the Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), with headquarters in Prague, rather than affiliate through the Paris CGT. A Tass report of October 3, 1956 indicated that the General Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions had agreed to this request for direct admission to the WFTU. This operation, which delivered the entire nationalist union membership to Communist control and conforms to the general pattern of Communist takeover, paved the way for the subsequent liquidation of the rival Messalist militants and organizers by the FLN. This important development was never reported to Americans by the American press.

At the Fourth Congress of the WFTU in Leipzig in October 1957, was created a "World Labor Committee of Solidarity with the Algerian Workers." This committee was definitely set up at a common conference held in Cairo in September 1958 between the WFTU and the Arab Confederation of Trade Unions (formed in March 1957). From then on, several meetings took place between delegates from the General Union of Algerian Workers and those representing labor organizations affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions. On October 14, 1958, representatives from the General Union of Algerian Workers were received by the leaders of the FGDB, the East German Labor Organization.

Four months later, delegates from the FLN visited Prague, from the 17th to the 23rd of February 1959, where they held extensive talks with the leaders of the UEC, the Czechoslovak Labor Organization. Following these meetings, and in accord with the WFTU, the FLN-controlled General Union of Algerian Workers set up permanent offices in East Berlin and Prague. Moreover, the WFTU extended to the FLN fellaghas a subsidy of 5,000 pounds sterling, and the East German Labor Organization paid them a first allotment of 200,000 marks.

As early as the Spring of 1958, several governments of the satellite Peoples' Democracies extended official aid to the FLN, disguised under the heading of "Aid to refugees." Thus, on May 29, 1958, the Hungarian Cabinet forwarded to the "Algerian refugees" the sum of 100,000 florins. In January 1959, there was set up in Budapest a "Committee for the support of the Algerian refugees." In July of the same year, the Czechoslovak Government extended a payment of 70,000 crowns as "Aid to refugees." The financial help from East Germany is estimated at 4,000,000 marks as an act of "workers solidarity," and early in 1961 a delegation of East-German communist organizations gave to the Algerian Red Crescent the equivalent of 500,000 marks worth of supplies. Others have followed since.

The cadres of the FLN's General Union of Algerian Workers are, as for all other African unions, organized and trained at the "Syndicalist African School" in Budapest, which began functioning on August 31, 1959. All courses given are under the direct responsibility of the official representative of the Federation of Soviet Labor Unions.

Early in 1960, 30 militant members of the FLN-controlled General Union of Algerian Workers were provided with Moroccan passports and "processed" through the WFTU as "students" with scholarships granted by the Hungarian government. At all levels stringent security measures were taken to insure that the "students'" identities remained unknown. The nature of the "study courses" which these students have by now completed is not known.

The action taken by the General Union of Algerian Workers at the World Congress of Labor Unions paralleled the Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria (GPRA) "Memorandum against the colonialist coalition of NATO" of September 19, 1960, which denounced the Atlantic Pact as "a factor of insecurity for the Arab Maghreb."

For the General Union of Algerian Workers, the independence of Algeria is an accomplished fact; what remains to be achieved is a future "Socialist Algeria" characterized by collectivism, nationalization and seizure. Rakhmoune Dekkar, one of the Executive Secretaries of the General Union of Algerian Workers has declared: "If peasants and workers have taken up arms, it is not for the conquest of a flag or of a National anthem. Our struggle is a class struggle. The workers' participation in the armed struggle today guarantees for them the taking over of the country tomorrow."

2. MILITARY: Without the Communist bloc's military aid covering armaments and training, the FLN's war potential would be nil. Among the Peoples' Democratic Republics committed to military aid, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Red China and North Vietnam are the most conspicuous.

It should be recalled that in the Summer of 1954, prior to the outbreak of the Algerian rebellion on November 1, 1954, Mustapha Ben Boulaid appeared in Tripoli with the latest news from the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action (CRUA) announcing that they were ready to begin the rebellion. On the strength of this, Ben Bella drew 3,500 pounds from the Egyptian consulate in Benghazi for the purchase of arms and with Azzouz took off for a top-level conference in Bern with Boudiaf, at which the final details of the coming offensive were settled. Hamadi, who would serve as a "military adviser" to Boudiaf, set out from Cairo on October 15, 1950 under the alias of Mahmoud Fehta (a well-established citizen of the small city of Mac Mahon) stopping at the paymaster's office at the Egyptian consulate at Benghazi, arriving on December 9th, 1954 in Kabylia at Belkacem

Krim's headquarters. On December 29, 1955, Hocine Benouarja, taken prisoner by the French forces, disclosed at length details of the FLN organization in Cairo and Tripoli, deliveries by Colonel Nasser of armament, political and terrorist directives, etc.

East Germany at the beginning devoted its activities to encouraging desertions from the Foreign Legion and exploiting the so-called "declarations" from desertors. This was accomplished in close contact with the "Nord Afrikanischer Club" in Hamburg, and a Moroccan office in Tetuan. Up to 1959, its operative was a German Communist, Winifried Muller, alias Si Mustapha ben Ali, alias Ahmed ben Ali. East Germany produced the documentary film "Algeria on Fire", which has been shown extensively in the Soviet Union and the satellite and neutralist countries. East Germany is today the main source of arms diverted to the FLN.

The aid extended by East Germany to the FLN does not cover "medical supplies" only: East Germany is the major base for the expedition of arms to the FLN. These arms, mostly from the stocks of the ex-Wehrmacht, follow two routes: one from Rostock to the free port of Hamburg, through the Elbe Canal and reaching Libyan and Moroccan harbors. The other route is through the Sarr, reaching terrorist cells of the FLN in France. For example, the following ships were seized by the French navy: on October 17, 1956, the freighter "Athos" with 70 tons of war materiel, some of a type not yet delivered to NATO at the time; the Yugoslav freighter "Slovenija" in 1958; and on April 7, 1959, the Czechoslovak freighter "Lidice." On June 26, 1956, the Spanish authorities seized the freighter "Swanee" with 300 tons of war materiel, and on June 16, 1957, the freighter "Juan Illueca" with 800 tons of war materiel. In all instances the armaments and ammunition were being delivered under the labels of "industrial equipment" and "medical supplies."

The looming power of Communist China is also present in the Algerian rebellion, and the history of China's relations with the FLN make interesting reading. The starting point here is 1957. Paradoxically enough it is to French initiative that we owe the beginning of that fruitful relationship. In 1957, France sent a mission to Peking from its own National Assembly made up of representatives favorable to the admission of Red China to the UN. The purpose of this mission was to promote and intensify commercial and cultural exchanges between France and Red China. It was at this point that Red China showed a decided interest in the Algerian rebellion and on November 15, 1957 proclaimed a "Day of Solidarity with the Algerian People" in Peking with appropriate press coverage by the Journal of Peking.

Three days later, on November 18, 1957, another similar manifestation in favor of an FLN Algeria took place, organized by the Federation of Chinese Students, protesting the arrest by the French authorities of Mahmoud Kemisti, General Secretary of the Algerian Moslems Students Union. In 1958, there was created in Communist China an "Association of Chinese Moslems." Another fact which the American press completely overlooked was the active help extended to these manifestations of Sino-Algerian friendship and solidarity by Tunisian labor, student and cultural groups, with the direct support of the Tunisian Government. On December 10, 1958, the first "official" contact with the FLN took place when a three-member mission under Ben Khedda (present Prime Minister of the GPRA) visited Peking; a closing communiqué solemnly reaffirmed the common resolutions passed at Bandung and covered the "aid" given by Red China to the "Algerian People."

On October 17, 1958, Ferhat Abbas, then President of the GPRA, was quoted as saying: "When Algeria will have conquered its independance, economic and cultural relations between Communist China and our country will be further developed."

On March 23, 1959, a nine-member delegation under Omar Oussedik, visited China for a stay of six weeks. In a public statement, Omar Oussedik revealed that the Chinese Government had pledged a loan of 10 million dollars without interest to the GPRA, to be paid back "the day Algeria becomes independant." These were not idle words, as the GPRA was able to open sizable accounts in Swiss banks under assumed identities, amounting to 20,000,000 dollars. These 20 million dollars, deposited at the rate of 2 million dollars every ten days allowed Mahmoud Cherif, in charge of the purchase of arms and ammunitions, to acquire them in the United Arab Republic, Iraq, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Albania.

In September 1959, a delegation of Algerian Communists headed by Larbi Boualem was present at the ceremonies commemorating the tenth anniversary of the Peoples' Democratic Republic of China. He promised that "very soon, an Ambassador from Communist China would reside in Algeria."

On November 27, 1959, was announced the recruiting of "Chinese volunteers" among Chinese Moslems to "fight side by side with their Algerian brothers." Its counterpart was a pressure to be applied on Mr. Bourguiba in order to press for his recognition of Communist China.

In April 1960, a third FLN delegation journeyed to Communist China: its objective was the renewal and, if possible, the increase of the 1959 financial aid. Politically it was found expedient to maintain Washington's apprehensions of a "rapprochement" between the FLN, (already enjoying the State Department's benevolent support and the consistent favor of the American press) and the Communist bloc: its effect would obviously be to create stronger Washington pressure on the French Government to reach a quick settlement of the conflict.

In fact, on June 10, 1960, intelligence reports reaching the State Department confirmed the existence of several secret agreements between the FLN and Communist China covering "technical, financial and military assistance." Another intelligence report of July 1960 disclosed that the Vice-President of the Peking cabinet, the Minister of National Defense, had designated Mr. Abdelhafid Boussouf as his official delegate for the organizing and extension of FLN activities in the following countries: Morocco, Tunisia, Chad, Soudan and Senegal. Boussouf is today in charge of politico-military and terrorist action in the GPRA, and a member of its inner circle.

In October 1960, Ferhat Abbas (former Premier of the GPRA) and Lekhdar Ben Tobbal were personal guests of Chou En Lai: the discussion covered the increase in "technical assistance to Algeria," the formation of "brigades of volunteers" to be based in Lybia and Tunisia, and the eventual delivery of aircraft to be based in Albania, near Tirana. Observers have declared seeing 49 FLN-marked airplanes on Lybian airfields and supplied not by the Soviet Union but by Communist China.

At the same time, a new FLN military mission had made its way to Peking, and a group of 120 "officers" from the National Forces of Liberation were being sent to military academies behind the Iron Curtain; coincidentally, the first agreement covering technical and scientific collaboration between Communist China and Albania was also disclosed. In the same month of October 1960, information in Cairo disclosed that the Communist Chinese aid to the FLN had been increased from 20 million dollars in 1959 to 50 million dollars in 1960.

On October 2, 1960, Krushchev, during his visit to the United States, received an FLN delegation at Glen Cove and declared: "We are in full accord."

On October 11, 1960, a spokesman for the FLN declared in Cairo: "Arab volunteers will be engaged in Algeria before any decision is taken by the UN, and Chinese materiel, devoid of distinctive marking, has already been introduced in large quantities in Algeria."

On October 21, 1960, Krim Belkacem announced in Rabat that the USSR and Communist China were ready to help the FLN army.

On October 30, 1960, Ferhat Abbas, then Premier of the GPRA, declared in the Italian Communist newspaper Unità: "We needed allies and we found them in Peking and Moscow."

On November 1, 1960, Ferhat Abbas declared: "Our government has been recognized by the USSR. The support of the Socialist camp is hereafter acquired."

In November 1960, the Soviet Union along with the Communist delegates of 81 countries recognized the validity of the term "National Democracy" in defining the regimes that the Communist Parties would help set up in the ex-colonial countries, regimes that would ultimately lead to the formation of "Peoples' Democratic Republics."

On December 7, 1960, the Communist China-FLN collusion was debated in the French National Assembly. Pascal Arrighi, Deputy from Corsica, disclosed that the port of Valona in Albania is being fitted to become a base of intervention on behalf of the FLN, that the 49 aircraft stationed in Lybia were no figment of the imagination and that thanks to Sino-Soviet aid, launching pads for FLN rockets would be erected on the Algerian coast 750 kilometers from Marseilles. Since the exchange of diplomatic missions between Rabat and Peking, it is obvious that among the 600 Chinese now in Morocco serving as "technicians," "experts" and "merchants" are military instructors implementing under the benevolent eye of the Moroccan government the type of assistance mentioned previously, that is, military and political which are quite inseparable under Communism.

3. STUDENTS: The Soviet Union and the Communist countries have long realized the importance of pursuing political action among students, particularly in underdeveloped countries. Dogma and discipline, as the backbone of Communist indoctrination, have been applied to form cadres ready to take over either directly or after patient infiltration. The Algerian students could not therefore escape the solicitous attention of Moscow.

Since September 1960, accords have been made between the GPRA (Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic) and the USSR. The financing of the Algerian students' stay in the Iron Curtain countries is through scholarships from either the Soviet bloc governments or the International Students' Union, or the World Federation of Trade Unions, or directly from the GPRA.

The recruiting and transportation of students is under the control of the FLN through the Executive Committee of the UGMA. Students are provided with Tunisian or Moroccan passports, with which they are also able to reach the United States and Latin America. Two "students," Ait Chaalal and Chaib Taleb, toured South America on UN passports. In this country, the FLN maintains a most active diffusion of propaganda in colleges and universities, through its Information Office in New York.

On February 11, 1961, the Overseas Press Club in New York was host to the United States National Students Association and its Student Editors Conference, and it became most evident to observers present that the Students Association officers were most efficiently handled by the FLN operative, Abrous, enrolled at the time at the University of Pennsylvania and maintaining close contacts with Progressive and Communist student groups on campuses, particularly in the West, U.C. Berkeley, Bay Area Student Committee.

In 1959-60, 355 scholarships had been granted by various countries. Twenty-eight Algerian students, residents of Tunisia, were sent in October 1960 to Moscow. Red China offered 150 scholarships; East-Germany 125; Albania 5; Bulgaria 20. Eleven Algerian students were granted scholarships by the International Students Union and 12 pupils on the high-school level were enrolled in Banquie, near Sofia. Czechoslovakia has granted 30 scholarships. Five Algerian students, through ISU scholarships, are enrolled at the Bucarest (Rumania) University, Petroleum Studies Branch.

Studies of variable duration are organized in all countries of the Communist bloc and are made available to the Algerians. At the highest level is the "School of Higher Studies of the Communist Party" or "School of Cadres": its instruction is essentially theoretical and ideological, with specialized courses in guerrilla warfare and other "practical" subjects. The Chinese Communist Party makes similar studies available, based on the experience of the Chinese Revolution. The East German Republic, from disclosures made in 1960, operates "Camp Molkoberg," 100 kilometers east of Berlin, under the supervision of the Soviet Secret Service. There, FLN members receive a six-month course in classic Communist indoctrination, plus an intensive training in espionage and sabotage techniques.

Bulgaria, Roumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany and Red China devote their activities to the orientation of students, workers and the wounded—the elite among them being sent on to Moscow for further indoctrination and training.

Part II

DIPLOMATIC AGREEMENTS MADE BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST BLOC AND THE GPRA

Prague-GPRA Agreement of March 1961

In the course of the Algerian rebellion there have been many agreements and accords made between the FLN and the Communist bloc nations relating to such matters as the sale and delivery of arms, the granting of scholarships, etc. None of these agreements covered the future relationship of the newly independent Algerian republic to the Soviet bloc. In March 1961, however, two agreements were signed by the GPRA and the Soviet bloc which insure that the total political and economic objectives of the future Algerian state will be fulfilled in the role of a bona fide member of the Eastern bloc.

The first agreement, signed between the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic and the Czechoslovakian Government in March 1961, is an economic

agreement and its existence was made public by the Communist press. In the Journal Officiel (French Parliamentary Record) of June 17, 1961, M. Couve de Murville, De Gaulle's Foreign Minister, acknowledged that the French Government had at the time been informed of the exchange of signatures in Prague.

Moscow-GPRA Agreement of March 27, 1961

The second agreement, known as the secret Moscow-GPRA Agreement of March 27, 1961, was signed in Moscow between the Soviet Government and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic. This agreement has not been made public by the signers for obvious reasons, although neither has denied its existence when it was brought to light by a member of the French National Assembly. Actually, the secret agreement merely confirms what is already known to be the basic military, political and economic objectives of the GPRA as indicated in other documents and declarations, particularly those made at the recent conference of Afro-Asian "neutralists" in Belgrade. The source is quoted directly:

"An Agreement to cooperate on seven points was signed by the USSR and the GPRA in Moscow on March 27, 1961.

It comprises:

- 1) - the definite liquidation in an independent Algeria of all traces of colonialism and neo-colonialism;
- 2) - the collectivization of industry and agricultural estates;
- 3) - an economic agreement to reserve 50% of Algerian foreign trade for the Communist bloc;
- 4) - prohibition to sign any economic accord with France, Spain and the German Federal Republic;
- 5) - creation of an Algerian popular militia;
- 6) - liquidation of all French military bases within one year and prohibition to grant any bases under any form whatever to NATO;
- 7) - to call a new Bandung conference to decide on the Sahara.

This Agreement bears the signatures of Alexis Kossyguine, First Vice-President of the Council of the USSR, member of the Presidium of the Russian Communist Party, and Jacob Malik, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the Russian side, and Ahmed Francis, GPRA "Minister for Economic Affairs and Finances" on the other side. Nouritdine Moukhitdinov, member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, representing the Moslem republics in the USSR, was also present.

During the speeches which preceded the signing of the Agreement, Alexis Kossyguine is reported to have declared:

"The Government of the USSR places its absolute confidence in the GPRA... It counts on its ally never to accept a fictitious independence or any obstacles to Algerian sovereignty, inside or outside the country."

During the week of December 15, 1961, Mr. G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs was fully informed of the FLN-Soviet-Communist collusion by a prominent Representative of Algeria at the French National Assembly, Vice-President of the European Parliamentary Union.

PART III

THE ROLE OF THE ALGERIAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE FLN REBELLION

The Algerian Communist Party, like all communist parties, if we momentarily except those of Albania, China, North Vietnam and Yugoslavia, is of strict Moscow obedience. Its tactics and action offer no deviation from Moscow directives. As its influence within the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic or the Front of National Liberation grows, its effects will be more acutely felt by the West.

Today the very core of the GPRA is, following the uncereemonious overthrow of Ferhat Abbas, composed of activists whose ideological allegiance to Marxism cannot be denied, even by the most blind leaders of the West:

Ben Youssef BEN KHEDDA, the Marxist theoretician, nicknamed "le Chinois" (Chinese) for his pilgrimages to Peking and his close relations with Mao Tse Tung and Chou En Lai. Ben Khedda is now President of the GPRA and most responsible for leading the FLN into the fold of the world Communist revolution. His brother was on the staff of L'Alger Republicain, the Communist daily of Algiers. Ben Khedda has been the real power behind the scenes and assumed the Presidency after it was decided that the "moderate" Ferhat Abbas no longer served any useful purpose.

Lakhdar BENTOBAL, Minister of the Interior of the GPRA, is the Himmler of the FLN. Under his direction have been perpetrated some of the bloodiest and cruellest acts of terrorism and murder imaginable. It was with M. Bentobbal that G. Mennen Williams dined during his visit to GPRA headquarters in Tunis in 1961. Bentobbal, formerly commander of Wilaya 2 (North Constantinois) is considered one of the hard-core revolutionaries. It will be his job to "liquidate" all opposition to the establishment of a Communist state in Algeria when and if the FLN assumes power.

Abdelhafid BOUSSOUF, Minister of Communications, is another of the hard-core revolutionaries who was one of the members of the CRUA, Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action, the organization which launched the rebellion. Boussouf was one of the field commanders, in charge of Wilaya 5 (Oranie). He is a dedicated, fanatic revolutionary who will entertain no compromise with the Europeans in Algeria or with French interests.

Belkacem KRIM, Vice Premier and Minister of the Armed Forces of the GPRA, is another of the hard-core revolutionaries whose history goes back to the very beginning of the rebellion. Krim was one of the members of the O.S. (Organization Spéciale) practicing banditry in the Kabyle Mountains even before the rebellion. As chief of Wilaya 3, he was responsible for the assassinations, exactions and destruction of property in the Kabyle region until 1958 when he joined the "Provisional Government" in Tunis as Minister of the Armed Forces. Krim is an advocate of the "hard" line.

Researchers have found it extremely difficult to obtain biographical data on some of the most active and important members of the FLN. Why? We know from past experience that biographical data on some of the world's best known Communists is scant indeed. However, by careful study some helpful knowledge is obtained, and sometimes the background information is interesting indeed.

For example, one of the most interesting figures of the FLN apparatus, little known outside of intelligence agencies, is the ex-Nazi collaborator Ahmed Ahmed-Bioud, alias Bayoud, ex-assistant secretary-general of Ferhat Abbas' Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto (UDMA), representative for Algeria in the "North Africa Liberation Committee" in Cairo. Mr. Ahmed-Bioud followed Ferhat Abbas to the FLN early in 1956 after conversations on January 30 in Geneva with Ahmed Francis, member of the Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action (CRUA). Born in 1908 at Bou Tlelis near Oran, Ahmed Bioud married Marghareta Doppman, a Swiss woman of German descent. He was a school teacher before World War II. In 1944, he served the Nazis as head of the North African section of the "Deutsche Arbeits Front" in Berlin where he associated with Hadj Amin Husseini, Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. He fled to Cairo after the war, and in October 1952, was reported preceptor to the children of Gen. Mohammed Naguib, the Egyptian Prime Minister.

In January 1957, Ahmed-Bioud was in Cologne with Ahmed Kamal, a United-States Citizen of Turkish descent. The two had known each other in the past, for Kamal had been without doubt a contributor to Ferhat Abbas' Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto (UDMA) of which Ahmed-Bioud was assistant secretary-general. In 1957, however, their association was of another nature. Kamal had set up in Tripoli a secret society, the Islamic Association of North Africa (Jamaiat el Islam fy Ifriqya al Shamalya). Purporting to be a cultural group, this society was in reality working for the Algerian rebellion. Propaganda, technical and financial assistance, arms were dealt with, and the FLN no doubt looked upon their activities in Cologne with the highest favor. In the Summer of 1956, in fact, Ahmed-Bioud and Mohammed Boujemline, another of Ferhat Abbas' disciples had extensively traveled in Switzerland, West Germany and Holland in search of arms for sale, in partnership then with Kamal and Idriss Abdelkrim, son of the exiled Riff leader. Ahmed Bioud has slipped once more into obscurity. For how long?

From October 31, 1954, when the order went out to the waiting "action groups," terrorist cells, and teams of saboteurs, to 1957, the Communist treatment of the Algerian question was not clear-cut. If they were ready to throw their support to the insurrection, they had to be careful not to damage Franco-Soviet relations or the influence of the French Communist Party. The Soviet Union itself while covertly supplying arms to the rebels and maintaining close contacts with their leaders abroad moved cautiously, diplomatically. In May 1956, at the conclusion of conversations in Moscow between Bulganin and Guy Mollet the parting communique merely expressed the hope that the French Government "acting in liberal spirit will be able to find for this important problem an adequate solution which reflects the spirit of our times and the interests of the people." In July 1957, TASS expressed the thought that force was not the answer to the problem (on the part of the French) but that Morocco and Tunisia should serve as examples for the French in their dealings with Algeria. It should be noted that this shift in policy occurred after Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov visited the Arab world.

In the Spring of 1956, the Communist objectives were marked by a change of tactics by the Party. A concerted effort was made to identify the Communist cause with that of the nationalists. When the latter refused to form a united front, the Communists formed their own underground movements, the "Liberation Fighters," the main channel of penetration of the nationalist liberation movement, and the "The Combattants of Liberation" operating primarily in the west of Algeria. In July 1956, the Party dissolved these groups and ordered them to join the FLN Army of National Liberation (ALN). This move was a Communist bid for a more active role in any future all-Algerian movement, and a preparatory strategic move to foster their typical "united front" campaign. During that period "immediate end of hostilities" and "peace" were Communist slogans, together with "united front" and "unitary labor movement," objectives achieved on October 3, 1956 with the affiliation to the World Federation of Trade Unions of Communist obedience of the General Union of Algerian Workers (FLN). Anti-colonialism served, of course, as a leit-motiv.

Among the most important Front organizations controlled by the Party were the following: Union of Confederated Trade Unions of Algeria (WFTU); Union of Algerian Women (WIDF); General Union of Muslim Students of Algeria and the Association of North African Students, both affiliated with the ISU, and delegations of which attended the Afro-Asian Students Conference in Bandung; Association of Algerian Democratic Youth (WFDY); the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ); the National Federation of Deportees, Internees and Patriots of the Resistance (FNDRP). The purpose of these front organizations was infiltration, and the creation of a favorable "climate" in the world's press, among liberal organizations, etc..

In all domains, the Algerian Communist Party toes the Line, as the following extracts from its clandestine publication, Theoretical and Political Review: Algerian Realities and Marxism (No. 7 - September 16, 1961) shows:

Editorial: "Never have the prospects of an independent, democratic and social Algeria been so close."

"The new government (Ben Khedda) and the general direction of its action as expressed by its communique of August 28, (1961), has been greeted with enthusiasm by the Algerian people, in particular by its forces of progress, its working class, its poor peasantry, its intellectuals and its youth. Why this enthusiastic greeting? Because the Algerian masses expected these decisions, decisions that are the results of a political progress in the conscience of the masses and the hard experiences of a long war of liberation."

(BACHIR HADJ ALI)

"The Algerian people have deeply thought about the problem of foreign alliances. It has reached two simple conclusions: Without the material and diplomatic aid of NATO and the United States, France would never have been able to wage such a long war. -- Thanks to the material and diplomatic aid of the countries of the Socialist camp in Africa, Asia and Latin America, our people have been able to resist by its struggle the coalition of France and its allies."
(BACHIR HADJ ALI)

"Anti-Sovietism is scornfully rejected by our people. Any new illusions on Kennedy's anti-colonialism are dissipated with the Cuban and Bizerte affairs."
(BACHIR HADJ ALI)

"Brotherly rapports of cooperation and union are woven and rewoven with our FLN brothers. This change in the political life of the country is beneficent to all our people, to the working class and to the FLN itself as a leader in the struggle. No doubt that our action has most contributed to the corrective and straightening measures taken by the National Committee of the Algerian Republic. From it, we have no other pride than that felt from the part we have played in the construction of a common edifice."
(BACHIR HADJ ALI)

"The Communist Party of Algeria has always, without equivocation, supported the FLN and the GPRA.

"Algerian patriots, as well as all Latin-Americans, follow with passion the Cuban experience. Why is Cuba in the avant-garde of the two Americas? Because, aside from its struggle full of abnegation, aside from its solidarity with the Socialist Camp, Cuba possesses a Communist Party solid in structure and firm in principles, because within the Castro movement, within the life of the country, reactionary and anti-communist forces at the service of foreign imperialism have been destroyed. The Algerians will meditate more and more on the Cuban lesson; China and North Vietnam will not fail to confirm that the real progress of the masses cannot take place without the Communists or by fighting them."
(BACHIR HADJ ALI)

"This anti-imperialist and progressive orientation shown by the GPRA communique of August 28, must be realized with the collaboration of all. Our party will find it an honor to be among the worthiest artisans of its application."

"In their speculations, the imperialists have lost sight of an essential factor and one of the major characteristics of our times: the extraordinary push of the masses, notably in Cuba, in the States of the French Community, in Brazil, in Guiana and in the Congo where the formation of the Adoula-Gizenga stage is but the first step in the struggle of the Congolese people for the reunification of the country against the Katangese puppets and against the international monopolies that are fighting for the riches of the country."
(SADEK HADJERES, Head of the Algerian Communist Party)

"Non-engagement can have for us only one meaning, as underlined by Ben Khedda, the refusal to participate in those military coalitions the sole purpose of which is the consolidation of imperialist powers, and whose participation in NATO and in the colonial wars in Algeria and Angola is a conclusive example."
(SADEK HADJERES)

"Back from a trip to South America as the head of an FLN mission, Ben Youssef Ben Khedda, today President of the GPRA, gave to the newspaper El Moudjahid of

January 5, 1961, the following impressions: In spite of a century of independence, Latin America presents all the characteristics of semi-colonialism, and concluded: The Monroe Doctrine of "America for the Americans" has been translated in fact into "America for the USA." There is in South America a fundamental aspect of neo-colonialism which, in contrast with classical colonialism does not exploit a people directly as is the case in Algeria, but does it through the intervention of a class to which it grants all sorts of privileges, while masses stagnate in misery, illiteracy and injustice." (BEN NASSIMIMOUN)

Following these extracts from an official publication of the Algerian Communist Party, it may be appropriate to examine the elements of structure and ideology that will allow a smooth transition of the GPRA to an Algerian Popular Republic.

There exist between the FLN and the Communist Party many similarities that affect organizational structure, methods and tactics; all fundamental to the seizure and maintenance of power.

Ex-members of Communist labor unions, many FLN activists have been formed at Communist schools where they have been taught the methods of subversive and clandestine warfare. Among the FLN many are ex-soldiers of the Indo-China war, who, as prisoners, have been "conditioned" by the Viet-Minh or trained by them. In the upper echelon of the FLN are also Communist activists or Marxist theoreticians such as Ben Youssef Ben Khedda, Abdelhafid Boussouf and Omar Oussedik.

To these should be added the following:

- Hierarchy of "liaison and information," with one leader at each echelon.
- Labor Union hierarchy.
- Women organizations.

The methods followed are those of "subversive war" and its objective is to capture the masses through strictly controlled psychological and educational action and terrorism. The FLN's extensive use of terrorism to force all of Algeria's Moslems to do its bidding cannot be overemphasized. Documented reports, particularly The Green Book, compiled in 1957, with hundreds of photographs of victims atrociously mutilated or murdered by FLN terrorists reveal the horror in all its nauseating detail. This terror is practised against defenseless civilians, men, women, and children alike. Should the FLN take power in Algeria it is most likely that these same gruesome methods will be used to subdue all elements of opposition in Algeria.

Terrorism, of course, is one of the important tools of Communist conquest: "All excesses have a revolutionary importance; a period of terror is necessary." Mao-Tse-Tung.

FLN phraseology and themes of propaganda are blue-printed from Marxist propaganda and phraseology.

On the doctrinal plane, the Algerian Communist Party's policy has always been to infiltrate and eventually take-over any Algerian movement of independence. Among the decisions reached by the Central Committee of the Algerian Communist Party, one stated: "Take the lead of the Algerian Nationalist Movement in order to create a Popular Republic of Algeria."

If the policy of the French Communist Party is sometimes ambiguous, it leaves to the "parallel networks," or front groups, the more open support of the FLN: The "Anti-colonialist Movement of France" (MAF) is the master front organization, created by international Communist agents (notably Henri Curiel) and covering all other fronts, should they be progressist or Communist. The main concern of the French Communist Party is to exploit to the maximum all movements favoring "peace" in Algeria still without being considered the sole support of the FLN cause.

The policy of the Algerian Communist Party regarding negotiations with the French Government is one that advocates following the "moderate" line rather than the "hard" line advocated by some members of the GPRA. As one would expect, Ben Khedda, advocates the "moderate" line.

What is the "moderate" line? It is to offer De Gaulle those face-saving concessions which will perhaps make it possible for him to use the French Army itself to impose FLN rule over Algeria. The FLN can only take power with the aid and assistance of the French Army. De Gaulle has promised this aid if the FLN will make several "concessions."

However, there are certain intransigent elements in the FLN who are opposed to any concessions whatever. The Algerian Communist Party, however, much more realistic in the pursuit of its objectives, is trying to convince the diehards that the "concessions" to De Gaulle are paper concessions only. This line was explained fully in a publication of the Algerian Communist Party, dated Algiers, November 7, 1961, entitled: "To Clarify and Clear the Road to Independence and Peace, An Appeal from the Algerian Communist Party." Several excerpts are quoted:

On the question of guarantees for the Europeans: "The Europeans who will choose Algerian nationality will enjoy complete equality of rights and duties.... However, the guarantees offered to the Europeans will in no way constitute an obstacle to the exercise of our people of its absolute right to dispose of its national riches....In this spirit, the Algerian state will reserve the right to nationalize all the great national riches of the soil and under-soil and will proceed on a profound agrarian reform."

On the matter of French Naval Bases: "Algerian sovereignty extends over all of the national territory, including Mers-el-Kebir (the Guantanamo of Algeria), Colomb-Bechar (site of nuclear tests), Reggane, etc.. Negotiations, possible on the subject of the bases installed there, will be based, particularly after the Bizerte experience, on the delays and methods of their evacuation and not on their indefinite occupation by France."

"What's more, the policy of non-engagement presupposes notably the effective withdrawal of NATO from Algeria, the refusal to belong to any imperialist military coalition or to Eurafrica, and the opposition to the use of our territory for nuclear experiments."

On the matter of the hard line itself: "The policy of all or nothing... This policy consists in believing that all can be had only by war, excluding all other methods, even when the colonial system has against it all of world opinion. This is to lose sight of the specific condition of the Algerian war, that the present objective of the ALN (Army of National Liberation) is not to fight the French Army in a classic type of war, but to use it militarily, politically and morally."

It will appear strange to some that the Algerian Communist Party should advocate the "moderate" line. But one must remember that the Algerian Communist

Party reflects the Kremlin's point of view, and the Kremlin is by no means interested solely in Algerian nationalism. Being far more realistic than the Algerian nationalists, the Kremlin must, first of all, advocate a policy which has a chance to succeed, particularly for the Communists.

Another most important consideration for the Kremlin is France itself. The Communists cannot support or advocate a policy which would be bad for the Communists in France. Therefore they are not interested in identifying themselves with the fanatic elements among the Moslems who offer the Europeans either the "valise or the coffin." This sort of racist holy war against the French would only increase the strength of the anti-Communists in France and their determination to resist the Moslem nationalists in Algeria. In reality, the long-range Communist objective is to build a bridge between Algeria and the Metropole, to be well-traversed by Communists, progressives, liberals and opportunists, and to make France completely dependent on a Kremlin-controlled Algeria for its oil and gas. Once this is accomplished, France will be in the bag, and West Germany, the country the Russians fear most, will have finally been out-flanked from the rear.

Since Ben Khedda is the Kremlin agent in charge, he will follow the Kremlin line.

New York, January 1962